lightning community – Can eltoo’s no-penalty design be exploited by malicious submissions of previous state?


Eltoo makes use of the no-penalty submission mechanism, the place the price for an adversary to submit an previous state is the transaction payment. This motion appears unprofitable, but when we add HTLC to Eltoo, issues appear totally different.

One impact of submitting the previous state is delaying the channel settlement. For instance, Alice and Bob have an Eltoo channel and the problem interval is 10 blocks. Then, they each intend to shut the channel on the block top 100. The distinction is that Alice commits the most recent state whereas Bob commits an previous one. Suppose Bob’s transaction is included within the newest block. Then, Bob continues to compete with Alice for the precise to submission and Alice didn’t commit the most recent state till the block top is 120. At this level, the channel settlement time is delayed from 100 + 10 = 110 to 120 + 10 = 130. If there’s an HTLC within the channel with an expiration time of 120, then the adversary’s delay adjustments the attribution of this HTLC. I am curious if Eltoo can be exploited by the above actions?

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